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Virtually every social interaction involves reasoning about the perspectives of others,
or ‘theory of mind (ToM).’ Previous research suggests that it is difficult to ignore our
current knowledge when reasoning about a more naïve perspective (i.e., the curse of
knowledge). In this Mini Review, we discuss the implications of the curse of knowledge
for certain aspects of ToM. Particularly, we examine how the curse of knowledge
influences key measurements of false belief reasoning. In closing, we touch on the need
to develop new measurement tools to discern the mechanisms involved in the curse of
knowledge and false belief reasoning, and how they develop across the lifespan.
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INTRODUCTION
Christmas is approaching. John’s 6-year-old sister, Maggie, is very excited about Santa Claus.
She has already written three letters to Santa, and is discussing the cookies she plans to leave
beside the tree. As an 11-year-old, John cannot understand why his sister believes in Santa Claus.
Doesn’t she realize that it is her parents who leave gifts under the tree? In this scenario John
is influenced by what is called ‘the curse of knowledge’ or ‘hindsight bias’ (see Fischhoff, 1975;
Camerer et al., 1989): because John knows that Santa isn’t real, it’s difficult for him to appreciate his
sister’s more naïve perspective. The curse of knowledge refers to a difficulty ignoring one’s current
knowledge when taking the perspective of someone less informed. This bias colors our ability to
reason about the less informed thoughts of others and even recall our own previously held naïve
perspectives. Considering the curse of knowledge’s profound impact on perspective taking across
the lifespan, it is important to consider this bias’s role in social perspective taking, or ‘theory of
mind’ (ToM).
We briefly review the literature on the curse of knowledge. We then discuss how the curse of
knowledge relates to ToM, focusing on the most widely used developmental ToM measures—
the classic false belief tasks. We then review literature investigating links between the curse of
knowledge and ToM across the lifespan. Lastly, we suggest future research objectives that will
illuminate issues critical to our understanding of the curse of knowledge and ToM.
THE CURSE OF KNOWLEDGE
The Curse of Knowledge Across Development
Our brains are geared toward acquiring knowledge, rather than ignoring it. Although we
sometimes unintentionally forget information, it is difficult to intentionally ‘unknow’ something
(see Golding et al., 1994). Cognitive and social psychological research has investigated the pervasive
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nature of the curse of knowledge and its effects on social
cognition and memory (see Lilienfeld et al., 2009; Roese and
Vohs, 2012). Typically, researchers investigate the curse of
knowledge by using either a memory design or a hypothetical
design (Pohl, 2007). In a memory design, researchers ask
participants to answer questions. Later, participants learn the
correct answers to the questions, and must recall their original
answers. Participants’ recollection of their original answers
tends to be biased toward the newly learned correct answers.
For example, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) asked participants
to estimate the likelihood of a set of possible outcomes of
Nixon’s future visit to the USSR (e.g., ‘The USA and the
USSR will agree to a joint space program’). Upon learning the
outcomes of Nixon’s visit, which included a joint space flight,
participants had to recall their earlier likelihood estimates of
the different outcomes. Participants’ newfound knowledge of the
actual outcomes to Nixon’s visit biased their recollections of their
prior estimates.
In a hypothetical design, participants learn the answer to
a question, and then estimate how they would have answered
the question if they had not learned the answer, or how
another individual, who had not learned the answer, would
respond. For example, Fischhoff (1975) provided participants
with descriptions of a historical event involving the war between
the British and the Gurka. Some participants did not learn
the war’s outcome, whereas others learned that ‘The British
and the Gurka reached a military stalemate.’ Subsequently,
participants considered several possible outcomes, including
the actual outcome. For each possible outcome, participants
estimated how likely it would be for a naïve peer to predict
that outcome. Compared to participants who did not learn the
true outcome, participants who learned the outcome estimated
that naïve peers would be more likely to predict the war’s true
outcome.
In curse of knowledge studies, participants’ current knowledge
biases their recollections of what they previously thought
and/or their ability to predict what someone else would think
(Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). The curse of knowledge is robust
and widespread. It occurs across a range of time intervals
between exposure to the privileged outcome information and the
hindsight judgment. More so, the curse of knowledge persists
after explicitly warning participants about it, and providing cash
incentives to avoid it (Camerer et al., 1989; Pohl and Hell,
1996). Indeed, the curse of knowledge occurs across a variety of
paradigms and information types (Bryant and Brockway, 1997;
Tykocinski et al., 2002; Blank et al., 2003); across cultures (Heine
and Lehman, 1996; Pohl et al., 2002); and has been documented
in many applied settings including business, education, and
politics, as well as in academic writing and legal, governmental,
and medical decision-making (e.g., Harley, 2007; Pinker, 2014).
Compared to research with adults, however, the developmental
literature has largely overlooked the curse of knowledge.
The Curse of Knowledge and Theory of Mind
We propose that there is a fundamental link between the curse
of knowledge and ToM (see also, Birch and Bernstein, 2007).
ToM encompasses social perspective-taking abilities that allow
us to reason about our own and others’ mental states. An
important aspect of ToM is the ability to infer the mental states of
individuals who lack knowledge about key information and who
consequently hold a false belief—a belief that is inconsistent with
reality. This aspect of ToM is called false belief reasoning.
Previous research shows notable improvement in false belief
reasoning between the ages of 3–5 years (for a meta-analysis, see
Wellman et al., 2001). In a classic task, a child observes Sally
playing with a ball and placing it in a box. Then, when Sally is
away, Anne takes the ball and hides it under a basket. The child
is then asked where Sally will look for the ball upon her return
(e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). At
3 years of age, children inaccurately say that Sally will look under
the basket (the ball’s current location). Rather than choosing
randomly between the two locations, children are biased in the
direction of their own knowledge. By 5 years of age, children
tend to respond accurately, and say that Sally will look where
she first hid the ball. A new wave of non-verbal false belief tasks
has reported success in false belief reasoning at a much earlier
age than 3 years. For instance, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)
showed that infants as young as 15 months demonstrate false
belief reasoning in a violation of expectation paradigm (discussed
shortly).
Why 3-year-olds fail the classic false belief task and its variants
is hotly debated (Miller, 2012). One view suggests that 3-year-
olds do not understand that minds can misrepresent reality
(e.g., Wellman, 1990; Perner, 1991; Gopnik, 1993). Another
view suggests that developmental changes in general cognitive
mechanisms (e.g., memory, language, executive functioning, and
processing speed) account for the developmental change on this
task. That is, 5-year-olds ability to perform the task may reflect
maturation of one or more general cognitive abilities rather than a
qualitative change in their conceptual understanding of the mind
(Zaitchik, 1990; Fodor, 1992; Bloom and German, 2000; for other
perspectives on false belief reasoning, see: Penn and Povinelli,
2007; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Sabbagh et al., 2013).
A variant of the latter view, the curse of knowledge account,
suggests that children do not necessarily undergo a qualitative
conceptual change in their understanding of the mind, but
that classic false belief tasks pose the additional demand of
ignoring one’s privileged knowledge—a demand that is especially
problematic for young children. Consistent with this view,
younger children are more susceptible to the curse of knowledge
than older children and adults (Mitchell and Taylor, 1999;
Birch and Bloom, 2003). The fact that most classic false belief
tasks require that an outcome-knowledgeable child predict the
perspective of someone less knowledgeable raises the question of
how much the developmental change in the curse of knowledge
bias contributes to the developmental change in false belief
performance.
Previous research suggests that the curse of knowledge also
affects young children’s impressions about how long they have
known information. Taylor et al. (1994) found that when
preschoolers learned new information (e.g., the color chartreuse)
they claimed they knew it all along. They were unable to
differentiate between knowledge that they learned long ago
(e.g., the color red), and knowledge that they learned that day
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(see also Sutherland and Cimpian, 2015). Consistent with this,
young children also struggle with recalling their own earlier false
beliefs. For instance, in another classic false belief task, children
guess the contents of a crayon box. After justifiably guessing,
“crayons,” they learn it actually contains balloons. When asked
to recall their earlier guess they claim they knew that there
were balloons inside. They aren’t just trying to look smart—
they also think that someone else will know there are balloons
inside. Interestingly, young children sometimes claim that others
will share their knowledge regardless of whether the others are
peers, adults, or even babies (Taylor et al., 1991; e.g., Caza et al.,
2016).
The curse of knowledge is more complicated than simple
egocentrism. Egocentrism predicts that an individual will
overestimate how widespread his or her knowledge, or ignorance,
is on a given topic. In other words, egocentrism predicts an over-
attribution of one’s own perspective (whether knowledgeable or
ignorant) to others. However, children only overestimate how
likely other people are to share their knowledge and do not
overestimate how likely other people are to share their ignorance.
To show this, Birch and Bloom (2003) investigated children’s
ability to infer another’s knowledge of the contents of different
toys when the children either knew or didn’t know the toys’
contents. Three- to five-year-old children saw sets of toys, each
containing “a special thing inside.” Children learned that Percy,
a puppet, had seen what was inside one set but not the other.
On half the trials, children saw what was inside both sets of
toys; on remaining trials, children did not see what was inside
either set, resulting in a 2 × 2 cross between Percy’s knowledge
(or ignorance) and the child’s knowledge (or ignorance). When
children knew the toys’ contents they overestimated Percy’s
knowledge compared to when they didn’t know the toys’ contents
(see Figure 1A). Interestingly, this bias decreased between 3 and
5 years of age, paralleling the developmental change in children’s
performance on classic false belief tasks. However, when children
didn’t know the toys’ contents, they didn’t overestimate Percy’s
ignorance compared to when they knew the toys’ contents (see
Figure 1B). Thus, children who didn’t see what was inside the
toys were more accurate in their judgments of what Percy knew
and didn’t know.
In another demonstration of the curse of knowledge’s role
in children’s ToM, Lagattuta et al. (2014) tested 4- to 7-year-
old children’s and adults’ ability to estimate a naïve individual’s
interpretation of pictures. A cover over the pictures revealed
only a small, often uninformative, portion of the picture. Some
participants saw the pictures before they were covered, and
others only saw the covered pictures. Participants who saw the
pictures before the cover, and thus knew the pictures’ identity,
overestimated the likelihood that a naïve individual would
correctly guess the pictures’ identity (see also Mossler et al., 1976;
Chandler and Helm, 1984; Taylor, 1988). Moreover, consistent
with earlier research, children were more likely to be biased by
their knowledge compared to adults (see also Epley et al., 2004;
Lagattuta et al., 2010).
Similarly, Bernstein et al. (2004) found that knowledgeable
children and adults were more likely to overestimate their peers’
knowledge. In this procedure (a visual hindsight bias task, see
Figure 2 and Harley et al., 2004), 3- to 5-year-old children and
adults saw degraded images of common objects that gradually
clarified on a computer. In a foresight condition, participants
identified an image as it clarified. In a hindsight condition,
participants first saw a clear version of the image, and then
estimated when a naïve peer would identify the image as it
clarified. Participants who had previously seen the clear images of
the objects overestimated how early their peers would be able to
identify those objects. In a study examining participants from 3 to
95 years of age, Bernstein et al. (2011) found that the bias follows a
u-shaped pattern across the lifespan, with preschool children and
older adults exhibiting more curse of knowledge bias than older
children and younger adults.
FIGURE 1 | Results from the knowledge assessment task used in Birch and Bloom (2003). Y axis reflects the mean number of ‘yes’ responses to the
question ‘Does Percy know what is inside this toy?’ across six trials. That is, the Y axis shows the mean number of times that the participants indicated that Percy
would know what is inside the toy. (A) Shows the results for toys that Percy had not seen before. (B) Shows the results for toys that Percy had seen before. Black
bars illustrate the performance of children who saw inside the toy (child knowledgeable), and white bars illustrate the performance of children who did not see inside
the toys (child ignorant). The asterisks indicate a significant difference between the child knowledgeable and child ignorant conditions. From Birch and Bloom (2003).
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FIGURE 2 | Stimuli from the visual hindsight bias task. In the foresight
judgment condition, participants try to identify the object as it clarifies on a
computer screen. In the hindsight judgment condition, participants see the
object in advance of estimating when a naïve, same-age peer will identify the
object. From “Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age” by Bernstein et al.
(2011).
Importantly, Bernstein et al. (2007) showed a link between
performance on hindsight bias tasks and classic false belief tasks
among 3- to 5-year-old children. The researchers presented
participants with visual hindsight bias tasks (see above) and
verbal hindsight bias tasks. In the verbal tasks, children tried
to answer six questions; later, children learned the answers to
half the questions, and tried to recall their original answers. The
researchers found that performance on both verbal and visual
hindsight bias tasks correlated with performance on the classic
false belief tasks. This correlation remained significant even after
controlling for age, language ability, and inhibitory control.
We are not suggesting that the curse of knowledge and false
belief reasoning are the same cognitive process. The curse of
knowledge refers to a more general cognitive bias that applies to
situations in which one needs to ignore privileged information
to reason about a more naïve perspective; thus, the curse of
knowledge is not limited to false belief reasoning. Moreover, false
belief reasoning doesn’t necessitate that one have specific outcome
knowledge. That is, one can deduce that an individual has a false
belief about an event outcome without knowing the outcome
him/herself. For example, imagine you know that Sally put her
chocolates in the cupboard before leaving. After Sally leaves, her
mother tells you, “Sally is not allowed to have chocolates. I’ll hide
them somewhere.” Although you don’t know where her mother
hid them, you can infer that Sally will have a false belief about
the chocolates’ location. However, most classic false belief tasks
(see Wellman et al., 2001) don’t take this approach. Rather, they
make the participant knowledgeable of the specific outcome (e.g.,
Sally’s mother moved her chocolates to the basket), unnecessarily
requiring the child to infer a false belief and overcome the curse
of knowledge.
Consider the following study showing that adults, who
understand that the mind can misrepresent reality, can be
hindered by outcome knowledge when reasoning about a
false belief. Birch and Bloom (2007) had adults complete a
four-container version of a false belief task. In all conditions
participants learned that the protagonist, Vicki, had placed her
violin in the blue container before leaving. All participants then
learned that the violin was moved to another container in
Vicki’s absence. One group learned that it was moved to the red
container; another group learned that it was moved to ‘another’
container (but did not know which container). All participants
then indicated the probability that Vicki would first look in each
container when she returned for her violin. Both conditions
require appreciating that Vicki would hold a false belief about
her violin’s location, yet adults who knew it was moved to the
red container rated the probability of her acting on a false belief
(i.e., first looking in the blue container) as significantly less
likely. These results reveal that even adults, who undoubtedly
have a conceptual understanding of false beliefs, can experience
difficulty in predicting the consequences of another’s false beliefs
(e.g., which action Vicki will take) when they have specific
outcome knowledge (e.g., it was moved to the red container). This
raises the question: how much of children’s difficulties with classic
false belief tasks is due to their exaggerated curse of knowledge
bias instead of a conceptual deficit in false belief reasoning.
We acknowledge that there are developments in children’s
social perspective-taking abilities besides their decreasing
susceptibility to the curse of knowledge. To disentangle these
developmental changes, we call for new ToM tasks that reduce
or eliminate the curse of knowledge and minimize other task
demands. Ideally, these new tasks would employ continuous
measures rather than simple pass/fail dichotomies that, by
their very nature, can only produce (seemingly) qualitative
developmental shifts (see Sommerville et al., 2013). In significant
ways, the new wave of non-verbal false belief tasks reporting
success at false belief reasoning in infancy (e.g., Slaughter, 2015)
have made several improvements. Compared to the classic tasks,
these newer tasks (a) eliminate verbal demands, (b) use more
sensitive continuous measures (e.g., looking time; see Brooks
and Meltzoff, 2015), and (c) require participants to make sense
of someone’s actions in retrospect, after watching the scenario
unfold (e.g., infants look longer after seeing the protagonist look
for the object in a box where she should not know it is), rather
than requiring participants to make a priori predictions (e.g.,
“where will Sally look for the ball?”; see Miller, 2012). This latter
alteration may reduce the effects of the curse of knowledge bias
that to date has only been shown to bias participants’ a priori
predictions.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
The curse of knowledge is relevant to ToM. We primarily focused
on the classic false belief tasks because of their widespread
use, but the curse of knowledge can operate anytime someone
possesses privileged information and must predict a less-
informed perspective. Thus, the curse of knowledge is relevant
to a wide variety of ToM tasks.
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More work is needed to illuminate the mechanisms underlying
the curse of knowledge and ToM. We predict that the curse
of knowledge is not a result of a singular cognitive mechanism
such as inhibitory control but more likely the result of two or
more cognitive mechanisms and biases working in tandem (e.g.,
inhibitory control, working memory, and fluency misattribution)
that may contribute differential effects depending on the age of
the participant (e.g., see Birch and Bernstein, 2007; Groß and
Bayen, 2015a,b, for discussion). The curse of knowledge has been
studied extensively in young adults, with limited research in
children and older adults (see Bayen et al., 2007; Coolin et al.,
2015). ToM, conversely, has been studied extensively in young
children but less in adults (see Birch and Bloom, 2007; Samson
and Apperly, 2010; Miller, 2012; Surtees and Apperly, 2012).
Future research examining these constructs across the lifespan
from infancy through old age will provide a more complete
understanding of the developmental changes in the curse of
knowledge and ToM (and how the two relate). We believe
that future research would benefit from new continuous ToM
measures that can be used across development rather than during
a small developmental window such as the infancy or preschool
period (see Bernstein et al., 2011; Cassels and Birch, 2014). More
continuous measures (e.g., Sommerville et al., 2013) would also
aid in examining the many social and emotional correlates of
individual differences in ToM and assist in identifying individuals
that would benefit most from intervention techniques (see
Caputi et al., 2011; Schaafsma et al., 2015). We encourage
researchers to continue to move beyond false belief reasoning as
the so-called ‘litmus test’ for ToM—as Paul Bloom and Tamsin
German aptly noted, “there is more to ToM than false belief
reasoning” (Bloom and German, 2000). Moreover, when an
assessment of false belief reasoning is warranted we suggest
researchers consider a variant that does not ‘curse’ the child
with specific outcome knowledge, such as the aforementioned
example where the antagonist hides the object in an undisclosed
location or a variant akin to that used in Birch and Bloom
(2007).
We, as humans, use ToM in virtually every social interaction.
These abilities profoundly affect our social-emotional health,
provide the foundation for moral regard and empathic concern
for others, reduce prejudice and cultural intolerance, promote
prosocial behavior and social competence, and predict academic
achievement and better quality of life indices (for reviews see
Capage and Watson, 2001; Chandler and Birch, 2010; Smith
and Rose, 2011). Unfortunately, our current assessment tools
limit our understanding of ToM and its correlates. The first step
toward a more nuanced appreciation of ToM is to design and
validate better measurement tools.
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